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A	Canadian	perspective	on	CETA	+++:	those	pluses
will	come	with	minuses
What’s	the	difference	between	CETA,	the	agreement	between	Canada	and	the	EU,	and	the	CETA
+++	that	some	Brexiters	believe	they	can	obtain?	Kurt	Hübner	(University	of	British	Columbia)
gives	a	Canadian	perspective	on	the	merits	of	CETA	and	explains	what	else	Britain	would	be
seeking	from	the	EU.	The	UK,	he	concludes,	will	only	get	what	it	wants	through	compromise.
The	Canadian	Prime	Minister	Justin	Trudeau	branded	CETA	a	“great	model	of	a	progressive	trade
deal…	It	is	not	just	a	great	deal	for	each	side	but	also	a	model	to	the	world.”	This	sentiment	was
early	on	echoed	by	Boris	Johnson	and	other	like-minded	individuals	who	saw	CETA	as	a	lightning	rod	for	a	post-
Brexit	UK-EU	agreement.	David	Davis	then	upped	the	ante	by	stating	that	the	future	between	the	UK	and	the	EU
would	be	based	on	a	CETA+++.	Michel	Barnier,	meanwhile,	seems	to	think	that	CETA	will	become	the	only	game	in
town.
Davis’	preference	for	CETA	+++	is	not	seen	as	a	realistic	option	by	the	EU.	Nonetheless,	the	CETA	could	be	seen	as
a	relevant	model	when	it	comes	to	post-Brexit	agreements.	It	is	relevant	because	CETA	is	the	first	EU
comprehensive	trade	agreement	with	a	highly	developed	capitalist	market	economy	and	as	such,	it	tells	us	a	lot
about	the	aspirations	and	also	about	the	limits	of	economic	cooperation	outside	the	framework	of	the	Single	Market
and	the	Customs	Union.	Whatever	will	be	the	end	result	of	negotiations,	when	it	comes	to	securing	net	benefits	then
the	UK	staying	in	the	SM	and	the	CU	is	the	best	route	to	go.	All	other	options	differ	in	net	benefits,	and	are	only
second-best	options.	This	would	also	hold	for	a	CETA+++	–	in	the	best	case,	the	latter	would	be	at	the	top	of	all
second-best	outcomes.
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The	CETA		provisionally	came	into	life	in	September	2017	and	is	now	awaiting	ratification	by	national	(and	in	some
cases	regional)	parliaments.	Even	after	ten	years	of	preparations	and	negotiations,	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	full
CETA	version	will	ever	become	a	reality	as	the	ratification	processes	of	some	EU	member	states	have	thrown	up
severe	problems.	This	time	delay,	one	can	argue,	may	reflect	idiosyncratic	problems	between	the	EU	and	Canada,
and	thus	may	not	hold	for	a	similar	agreement	with	the	UK.	To	keep	things	simple,	let	me	accept	such	a	caveat	and
assume	that	the	EU	and	the	UK	would	come	to	a	much	quicker	solution.	What,	then,	is	CETA	delivering	and	what	is
it	not	delivering?
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First,	despite	the	attribute	‘comprehensive’	in	its	name,	the	CETA	is	very	much	a	goods-biased	agreement,	at	least
when	it	comes	to	cross-border	trade.	Bringing	down	tariff	lines	to	zero	over	a	period	of	seven	years	is	an
achievement,	but	then	it	is	an	easy	accomplishment	that	picks	mainly	low-hanging	fruits.	For	two	highly	integrated
economic	spaces	like	the	UK	and	the	EU	that	are	characterised	by	deep	cross-border	supply	chains,	items	like	rules
of	origin	and	regulatory	practices	are	of	extreme	importance.	The	required	domestic	content	of	products	that	qualify
them	for	a	zero-tariff	line	differ	from	sector	to	sector	in	CETA,	but	are	still	high	when	it	comes,	for	example,	to	the
automotive	sector.	This	sector	also	operates	with	quotas	that	limit	truly	free	trade.	Moreover,	good	exports	need	to
meet	EU	standards,	including	sanitary	and	phytosanitary	measures.	When	it	comes	to	agriculture	and	fisheries,	the
CETA	increases	some	quotas	but	keeps	overall	the	level	of	liberalisation	low.	Therefore,	the	UK	may	have	to	cross	a
bridge	if	it	wants	to	get	substantially	better	terms	from	the	EU.
Second,	when	it	comes	to	services	in	general	and	financial	services	in	particular,	the	CETA	keeps	very	close	to
WTO’s	General	Agreement	on	Trade	and	Services’	(GATS),	and	those	regulations	are	a	far	cry	from	what	the	City	of
London	needs.	Passporting	–	i.e.	a	regulation	that	would	allow	Canadian	financial	services	to	operate	within	the	EU
without	physical	presence	and	outside	EU	regulations	–	is	not	part	of	the	CETA.	This	is	a	minor	problem	for	Canada,
but	would	be	a	big	problem	for	the	UK.
Third,	the	CETA	gives	professionals	temporary	relief	in	terms	of	mobility	but	keeps	up	restrictions	for	general	worker
mobility.
Fourth,	the	CETA	opens	up	public	procurement	markets	beyond	WTO	norms	and	thus	creates	a	new	element	of
competition.
Fifth,	the	CETA	contains	a	new	investment	chapter	that	break	with	traditional	forms	of	investor-state-dispute
settlement	practices.	The	latter	is	seen	as	highly	controversial,	and	is	currently	the	chief	hindrance	for	final	ratification
of	the	CETA.
Given	the	Tories’	ambitions,	the	CETA	provisions	could	only	be	a	starting	point	for	the	UK.	To	transform	a	CETA-like
agreement	into	a	bespoken	+++	agreement	is	a	steep	step,	though.	The	easiest	part	seems	to	be	a	reduction	of
mutual	tariffs	for	manufactured	goods	below	WTO-rates.	The	CETA	can	serve	as	a	model	in	this	respect.	What
exactly	is	needed	beyond	those	easy	elements,	and	what	could	the	three	pluses	be?	First	and	most	critical,	the	UK
must	find	a	way	to	include	its	service	sector	in	any	agreement.	Given	its	strong	dependence	on	services	in	general
and	on	financial	services	in	particular,	the	UK	needs	to	develop	inroads	to	keep	passporting	rights	for	it	financial
institutions	to	avoid	an	exodus	to	EU	locations.	Such	an	offer	would	be	a	first	for	the	EU;	not	even	Switzerland,	which
makes	payments	into	the	EU	budget,	enjoys	passporting	rights	for	its	financial	companies.	The	British	wish	to
keeping	regulatory	sovereignty	and	free	access	to	financial	markets	of	the	EU	seems	to	be	too	good	to	become	a
reality.	And	yet,	without	finding	a	solution	for	the	financial	sector,	the	negative	economic	effects	of	Brexit	for	the	UK
will	get	stronger.
The	CETA	is	of	no	help	when	it	comes	to	dealing	with	Northern	Ireland.	Any	bespoken	agreement	would	need	a
special	chapter	that	may	allow	Northern	Ireland	to	stay	in	the	Customs	Union	and/or	in	the	Single	Market.	Such	a
chapter	may	actually	be	welcomed	by	the	EU	–	and	even	more	so	by	the	Republic	of	Ireland	–	but	would	mean	the
beginning	of	the	end	of	the	UK,	as	it	would	split	the	UK	into	a	small	part	that	is	integrated	into	the	economic	rules	of
the	EU	and	a	larger	part	that	operates	within	its	own	rules	and	practices.	The	second	‘plus’	would	require	a	special
treatment	clause	for	Northern	Ireland	that	does	minimise	negative	economic	and	political	costs	for	both	sides.	The
magic	formula	is	still	missing	here.
The	CETA	includes	a	policy	innovation	when	it	comes	to	foreign	direct	investments.	After	a	long	battle	driven	by
protests	of	civil	society	organizations,	the	CETA	removed	critical	parts	of	the	initial	agreement	and	substituted	the
traditional	state-investment	dispute	mechanism	with	a	new	investment	court	that	would	deal	with	potential	state-
investment	disputes.	The	EU	seems	to	be	firm	in	its	policy	to	make	t	this	new	institution	to	a	prominent	feature	in
future	treaties.	The	UK,	on	the	other	hand,	will	not	be	very	interested	to	have	an	independent	court	decide	about
dispute	outcomes	and	would	probably	refer	a	WTO	solution.	The	third	‘plus’	thus	will	be	to	avoid	the	introduction	of
an	independent	court	in	any	Post-Brexit	agreement.
A	CETA+++	seems	to	be	out	of	reach	as	long	as	it	stands	for	having	the	cake	and	eating	it.	It	may	become	a	guide	if
the	UK	indicates	its	willingness	to	compromise	in	critical	areas.	Compromises	will	come	at	a	price,	though.
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	This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Kurt	Hübner	is	Jean	Monnet	Chair	for	European	Integration	and	Global	Political	Economy	at	the	University	of	British
Columbia.
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